Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия 346 Proceedings of the International Congress on Historiography and Source Studies of Asia and Africa.Vol. I. 2020 the violence of the Russian Revolution, the aims of Bolshevik diplomacy differ very little from those of the Czars. And the aims that Stalin and Molotov have pursued since the end of the war vary little from the demands they made of Adolf Hitler. After summarizing wartime Soviet expansion, he continued: “It is clear, then, that expansion is not an innovation of the Communist regime. It is rooted in Russian history. Only the personalities and the tactics have changed.” He advised the U.S. adopting a carrot and stick approach toward its new ColdWar rival: it should extend an olive branch of peace while applying “firm resistance” to its ambitions to expand. Though he did not mention Korea directly, his statement mirrors the U.S. position at the Joint Commission. 1 British officials reached similar connections over Soviet ambitions regarding the Korean peninsula, arguing that Russians across generations shared that of the Soviet Union: securing an ice-free port in the Far East. Its postwar strategy in Korea was thus securing at a minimum permanent control over northern Korea and if feasible over the entire peninsula. This view was expressed in a handwritten comment penned by the British diplomat, G. F. Hudson, beneath a telegram from his country’s Moscow Embassy to the British Foreign Office in London. Hudson saw Soviet long-term plans developing as follows: The Soviet Union is likely to press for the granting of early independence for Korea against proposals for trusteeship, as this line will commend them to Korean nationalists and it is reasonable for the Russians to expect that by virtue of geographical continuity and of the compact organization of the local Communists the Soviet Union would soon gain a preponderant influence in an “independent” Korea. 2 This same prediction appeared in a more advance form in anAugust 1947 report compiled by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the British Chiefs of Staff titled “Soviet Interests and Intentions.” This report considered Soviet ambitions in various locations across the globe. In Korea it predicted that the Soviets were simply waiting for U.S. withdrawal from the south to gain “establishment of Communist control over country as a whole.” 3 Foreign diplomatic officers are 1 J. F. Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. P. 282, 283, 295. His account of the Moscow Conference omits all mention of discussions onKorea, despite the importance of themeetings to the peninsula’s future. See J. F. Byrnes. All in a Lifetime. NewYork: Harper & Brothers, 1958. Chapter 22. 2 Telegram from Mr. Roberts in Moscow to Foreign Office (November 11, 1945). FO 371 Far Eastern 1945 Japan File No. 1394. London: British National Archives. 3 Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities (August 6, 1947). Secret Files fromWorldWar to ColdWar: Intelligence, Strategy,