Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия Доклады Международного конгресса по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки. Т. 1. 2020 345 Their rejections, and apparent unwillingness to negotiate compromise, suggest both the U.S. and Soviet delegations stubbornly clinging to ideology-driven interests at the expense of the reunification interests of the Korean people. Considering peripheral events involving the two emerging superpowers, however, one might wonder whether the Commission would have enjoyed success even if they did manage to overcome their differences. U.S.-Soviet trust had been a waning since the final days of the war, and it continued to slide after Roosevelt’s death and Germany’s surrender. Soviet activity in Poland had, in U.S. eyes, particularly disturbed U.S. officials who transferred its intentions to other areas of contention, such as the Korean peninsula. 1 Poland shared with Korea one characteristic in that both territories had served as a conduit for Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany (Poland) on the western front, and Japan (Korea) at the eastern frontier to advance into Russian territory. However, at least Stalin’s public statements suggest his concerns lay more with Poland’s postwar leadership than with the Korea peninsula. Within the United States administration there were those who were critical of trusteeship as a system — it had proven a failure after World War I — and were negative toward any suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union had a postwar future as allies. With Roosevelt’s death those opposed to the president’s postwar idealism enjoyed the more practical and inviting ear of his successor, Harry S. Truman, a leader who proved to be more open to the views of others regarding diplomatic affairs. One with considerable influence was James F. Byrnes who served in both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. As Truman’s first foreign minister, Byrnes assumed a role as the president’s top advisor on foreign matters. He had accompanied Roosevelt to Yalta and Truman to Potsdam. He later led U.S. delegations to postwar foreign minister meetings, including the December 1945 Moscow meeting. His explanation of the division of Korea as a temporary “military convenience” that had evolved into a more permanent “closed boundary” omitted the role that the United States played in having postwar occupation penned into the 1943 Cairo Communique and trusteeship administration included in the 1945 Moscow Decision. 2 In Truman’s eyes, Byrnes’ attendance at Yalta qualified him as the president’s “expert” in postwar diplomatic issues. For this reason, his views on the Soviet Union are most interesting here, particularly considering the influence that he wielded over a president in the early years of the ColdWar. While admitting insufficient knowledge of Russian history, the secretary of state felt confident in concluding that despite 1 One argument links Soviet actions in Poland with those at the Joint Commission. See, for example, Yi Chŏngsik. Taehan min’guk ŭi kiwŏn [The Origins of the Korean Nation]. Seoul: Ilchokak, 2017. P. 100–103. (In Korean). 2 J. F. Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. London: William Heinemann, 1947. P. 219–20.