Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия 344 Proceedings of the International Congress on Historiography and Source Studies of Asia and Africa.Vol. I. 2020 These same forces, it continued, are set on establishing a separate southern Korean government. Identifying its link to the left-wing People’s Front, it vowed to “fight against reactionary elements for the success of the Joint Commission.” 1 Conclusions Both delegations blamed the other over the Joint Commission’s lack of success despite the two delegations’ efforts. The American Delegation pointed to the 24 political parties and social organizations that the Soviet Delegation had stricken from the list of groups to be accepted for consultation privileges. Should this decision hold, the American Delegation calculated, as many as 15 million Koreans, or half the Korean population, would be stricken from participation lists. The Soviet Delegation countered that the group could have participated if only their leaders accept without qualification the Moscow Decision process, including the role of trusteeship. As the sessions drew to a close both sides made suggestions to keep the process alive. These suggestions were rejected outright even though they potentially could have brought the two sides closer to the goals set by the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation proposed that the two sides conduct informal hearings with those parties that rejected trusteeship to ascertain where their objections lay. The American Delegation, believing this to be unnecessary as the two delegations planned to hold oral hearings anyway, immediately vetoed the gesture as a waste of time. 2 The Soviet side, which had voiced its disdain over a military occupation prior to division, then suggested a total military withdrawal from the peninsula, 3 another suggestion that the U.S. rejected. The United States, on the other hand, repeated a plan to turn the Korean case over to the United Nations Security Council, a proposal to which the Soviet Delegation offered no support. In a later publication the Soviet Union explained that it based its decision not to cooperate with the United Nations delegation over the illegality of this procedure, the delay it would cause Korea’s true independence, and the obstruction it would bring to the progress of unifying Korea. 4 1 Letter TO: The American Delegations to the Joint Commission, FROM Supporting Society for the Establishment of Anti-Japanese Movements (May 18, 1947) // NARA. 2 General Brown reported this proposal and explained why the United States rejected it in Statement to the Press by the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation Major General Albert E. Brown (August 7, 1947) // NARA. 3 The idea of total troop withdrawal was presented by Shtikov in Statement of the Soviet Delegation in the Meeting of the Joint Commission (September 26, 1947) // NARA. 4 The United States officially proposed this to the United Nations Security Council on Sep- tember 23. See Statement to the Press byMajor GeneralAlbert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner ofAmerican Delegation (October 17, 1947) // NARA. For the SovietArgument see Falsification of Elections in Southern Korea Under the Cloak of the U.N.O. Commission: Speech by the U.S.S.R Delegate Y. A. Malik in the Political Committee on December 8, 1948 // The Soviet Union and the Korean Question (Documents). London: Soviet News, 1950. P. 66–77.