Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия Доклады Международного конгресса по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки. Т. 1. 2020 343 would find it much easier to come to an understanding with the Russian delegates… if Dr. Rhee were completely out of the picture.” 1 Commission members also arranged meetings to discuss with Koreans their views on various issues being negotiated by the US and Soviet delegations. In July 1947 Edmund Fai, of the USMilitary Government’s Finance Department, met over dinner with Kim Kyusik and other Koreans to exchange views on the leftist position over group selection. A report summarizing this discussion noted that Kim supported the U.S. position that “all parties should be consulted which had signed Communiqué No. 5 and that …discussion of trusteeship at this time is neither beneficial nor proper.” He further showed concern over the Korean capacity to govern their country, admitting that “national temperament has changed profoundly and for the worse over the years of Japanese occupation.” The summary report focused primarily on Kim’s views, although conservative, appear rather moderate next to the extreme views harbored by Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku. 2 Members of the American Delegation also were granted audiences with Cho Mansik in the north, but their conversations cautiously avoided political matters due to the Korean’s precarious situation. 3 Ordinary Koreans also participated, primarily by communicating directly to the two commission leaders. One Yoo Yawng Chon [Yu Yang Chan?] signed a “Welcoming Greeting” on behalf of the alleged 800,000 members of the South Korean Democratic Women’s League. This correspondence, timed to arrive at the time the meetings reconvened, transmitted the League’s support for the Moscow Decision, and added a plea that the U.S. Delegates “work toward its completion.” 4 Also around this time, the Supporting Society for the Establishment ofAnti-Japanese Movements, wrote the American Delegation to “remind” it of the “reactionary elements” that were disrupting the Joint Commission process. After thanking the Americans for their efforts on behalf of Korean democratization and independence, the letter cited Korean traitors as a primary obstacle blocking the Commission’s success: As you know, after the Joint Commission adjourned because of obstructions by the pro-Japanese, National traitors and pro-Fascistic elements on 6May 1946, political confusion, economic rupture and cultural gloom in South KOREA has been most critical in our history and even in the history of the world. These reactionary elements and policies have arrested democratic patriots and put them into prison and even killed them. 1 IncomingMessage: FromWar (WDSPI) to CINCFE (Personal toMacArthur and Hodge) (May 27, 1947) // NARA. 2 Session with Kimm Kiusic and others (July 17, 1947) // NARA. 3 Buntz Commission, Visit to Pyong yang (October 8, 1946) // NARA. 4 The message also included a plea for female suffrage rights. A Welcome Greeting (May 23, 1947) // NARA.