Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия 340 Proceedings of the International Congress on Historiography and Source Studies of Asia and Africa.Vol. I. 2020 reviving the marching bands, and again hoisting the two participants’ national flags. The bickering, however, resumed. On one occasion the General Brown lamented over the impossibility of the two sides ever agreeing on fundamental definitions for concepts such as “social” and “political parties,” both critical terms for determining a group’s eligibility in the process. 1 The transcripts of the meetings demonstrate the two sides stalled in a vicious unproductive cycle, as reflected in the following exchange: Brown: After three months of deliberation, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has come to the conclusion that the Soviet Delegation defines a truly democratic party as one which subscribes to the principles of the Democratic People’s Front; that all other parties are defined by them as reactionary anti-democratic Shtikov: Whether they support the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission or do not, these demands of the Soviet Delegation fully follow that agreement which has been reached between Molotov and Marshall on the question of resumption of the work of the Joint Commission. Brown: Under what authority does the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation exclude parties that do not fully uphold the Moscow Decision? Shtikov: On the basis of the agreement that has been achieved in Point 1 of the three provisions it is agreed. Brown: Point 1 … states that “the signature of the applicant for consultation, Joint Communiqué No. 5, will be accepted as a declaration of good faith in upholding fully the Moscow Decision.” Shtikov: It seems that the American Delegation is thinking not of the question as how to exactly fulfill the agreement reached between the two Ministers, but how to avoid that argument. Otherwise General Brown couldn’t just now in Joint Commission session made such a statement in which he shows how parties and organizations should avoid documents signed not only by the Joint Commission but each of our governments. The discussion continued with both sides trading accusations that their counterpart misconstrued statements made in the past. To Shtikov’s contention that those opposed to trusteeship were trying to “kill two [political ambitions] with one stone,” Brown countered that it was the Soviet Delegation itself that was in search for one “stone to kill a few [political participants] which are very much alive.” 2 1 Transcript of Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the US-USSR Joint Commission, Seoul Korea (September 4, 1947) // NARA. The general eventually turned to dictionary definitions, which led to a discussion as to whether this source was adequate for this purpose. 2 Transcript of the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the US-USSR Joint Commission, Seoul, Korea (August 26, 1947) // NARA.