Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия Доклады Международного конгресса по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки. Т. 1. 2020 339 on Korea.” He then repeated the Soviet conviction that the American Delegation’s proposition not only allowed “parties and organizations which are hostile to this decision” to participate, but it also gave these hostile groups “an opportunity to continue their activities directed against the Moscow Decision with the exception that they should not instigate or format mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.” Rather than “call to reactionary parties and groups not to retreat from their hostile position toward the Moscow Decision,” it encourages them “merely to curtail temporarily their activities…so that they may have an opportunity to take part in the consultations with the Joint Commission.” Chistakov noted that many leaders of these groups immediately returned to actively fight against the process soon after signing Joint Communique No. 5. 1 The Soviet general appended a three-point proposal that would return the Soviet Delegation to the negotiating table should the U.S. deemed it acceptable. This proposal essentially required groups that had signed the Communiqué to honor its contents. Hodge’s response to Chistakov’s proposal was positive save for one amendment and several rewording issues. For example, in response to Point 2 where Chistakov proposed eliminating groups that had signed the Communiqué but then voiced opposition, Hodge countered this (successfully) by suggesting that in such a case these groups be allowed to substitute its leadership with a member who supports the process. 2 A similar exchange of letters took place between the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers, Vyacheslav Molotov and George Marshall. 3 The Molotov-Marshall agreement gained frequent mention during the disagreements that arose between Arnold’s replacement, Major General Albert Brown and Shtikov during this second round. Resulting from the foreign minister exchange was an agreement that parties opposed to the Moscow Decision be disqualified from the process of consultation. However, this produced a further disagreement over at what level would the party be deemed “in opposition” to the process. Did objection to an element within the process constitute overall opposition to the process? The Soviet side did offer an important compromise in agreeing to consult with groups that had previously rejected trusteeship, but now agreed to cooperate in the spirit and letter of the Moscow Decision. Questions also arose over the nature of anti-trusteeship protests: Were they limited only to verbal expressions, or did they also involve more active means, such as organizing mass protest rallies? On May 21, 1947 the two delegations relived the optimism of the first meetings of March 1946 by dusting off and amending previous welcoming speeches, 1 Chistakov to Hodge (November 26, 1946) // NARA. 2 Hodge to Chistakov (December 24, 1946) // NARA. 3 For the exchange of letters between Molotov and Marshall to reconvene the Joint Commission see FRUS 1947, VI The Far East. P. 632–35, 638–39, 640–42.