Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия 338 Proceedings of the International Congress on Historiography and Source Studies of Asia and Africa.Vol. I. 2020 The very next day Soviet Chief Commissioner Colonel General T. F. Shtikov’s welcoming address quickly qualified Hodge’s declaration. After his congenial welcoming remarks, Shtikov reminded his American counterparts that they too had committed to the process of trusteeship, an approach that corresponded “with the fundamental [hopes?] of the Korean people.” He then suggested that while the Soviet Delegation, too, respected free speech, the right had limitations: [I]n the way of the gradual democratization of the whole of the internal life of the Korean people, there stand serious difficulties, brought about by the furious resistance of reactionary and anti-democratic groups and certain elements, whose object is to undermine the work of creating and firmly establishing a democratic system in Korea. …. The future provisional Korean democratic government must be created on the basis of wide unification of all the democratic parties and organizations, supporting the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 1 In Shtikov’s mind, it was the “free speech” of the “reactionary and anti-democratic groups” who protested trusteeship (and thus the essence of the Moscow Decision) that could not be tolerated. Anything less than full acceptance should eliminate their right of consultation with the Commission. This disagreement eventually brought the talks to a premature halt in May 1946, after just short of two months of deliberations. It spilled over into a series of letters exchanged by the two commanding officers, Hodge and Colonel General Ivan Chistakov, and later between the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers, George C. Marshall and Vyacheslav Molotov, over the yearlong hiatus of talks. Here, both sides acknowledged the importance of their continuation, but traded accusations over which side was responsible for this breakdown. On November 1, 1946, for example, Hodge emphasized in a letter to Chistakov the necessity of restarting the meetings before summarizing the primary point of difference: “The representatives of the United States see a great difference between (1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Decision; and (2) the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government.” 2 Chistakov responded three weeks later with a statement of “regret”: the contents of this letter “do not differ from the position laid down in your previous letters, which, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision 1 Lieutenant John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State. 2 Hodge to Chistakov (November 1, 1946) // NARA.