Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия Доклады Международного конгресса по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки. Т. 1. 2020 337 total population of the Korean peninsula at the time hovered around 30million. Clearly political groups had inflated their membership lists and individual Koreans claimed membership in multiple political groups, with some appearing on five or six lists 1 . This 32-page report that analyzed responses found stark diversity between groups of different political orientation in some areas, but unexpected continuity in others. Clear and perhaps expected division appeared under the heading of political organization, with 90 percent of groups listed as “right-wing” supporting a national election for president, who would then appoint a legislature. These groups expressed overwhelming confidence in Syngman Rhee. Left-wing groups a strong cabinet, with a People’s Republic emerging from the People’s Front to dominate this political bloc. Sandwiched between the two were the moderates who leaned toward Kim Kyusik as the leader of a powerful legislation, to be appointed from among the groups that consulted with the Joint Commission. The groups displayed more cohesiveness under the category of “economic policy.” Here, the report concluded that “all major blocs support progressive agriculture and labor legislation,” particularly in the “nationalization of major industries, mines, railroads, and utilities.” The three blocs also favored some form of land reform, but varied in their ideas over compensation. For example, the left- wing supported a land redistribution similar to that advanced in the North with the new landlords not having to provide compensation for the land transfer. On the other hand, right-wing groups favored new owners compensating the former landlords in the form of annual payments of 20–25 percent of their harvests over 10–15 years. 2 These successes would be negated by the general failure to advance toward the Commission’s most important goal: the forming of a provisional Korean government to reunited the Korean peninsula. Ideological Clogs in the Joint Commission Process The first hint of trouble preceded the welcoming ceremonies organized to commence the meetings. John R. Hodge delivered the U.S. position in a Press Release dated March 19, the day before the festivities were to begin. Here Hodge informed that the “object of the American forces [is] to establish and perpetuate the freedoms of speech, assembly, religion, and press in Korea…. They represent principles on which any genuine democracy must be based and are as old as democracy itself. Furthermore, they are absolute and not relative or subject to exceptions.” 3 Void of context his words appear rather reasonable, a simple declaration of an important element found in his country’s Bill of Rights. 1 Analysis of Replies to Questionnaire Submitted to the Joint Commission. P. 5–9. 2 Ibid. P. 5–9. 3 Press Release: Statement of Aims U.S. Delegation on Joint American-Soviet Commis- sion in Korea (March 11, 1946 (?)) // NARA.