Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия 334 Proceedings of the International Congress on Historiography and Source Studies of Asia and Africa.Vol. I. 2020 goal was to establish “Korea as an independent state… [by] developing the country on democratic principles and liquidati[ng]… the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination of Korea”; 2) a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission would form for this purpose; 3) this Commission would work with democratic political parties and social organizations to actualize a provisional government; and 4) a conference of representatives from the two occupying powers would convene to establish “permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters.” The statement defined “trusteeship” in Point 3 as necessary for the “development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.” 1 Korean groups began to voice objections to “trusteeship” soon after the Decision’s release to the public on December 27. The Soviets responded by insisting that groups support the Decision in its entirety. Leftist groups soon fell in line, but key right-wing political figures continued their protests, equating the policy with that enforced upon them by the Japanese protectorate arrangement (1905–1910) prior to Japan’s outright annexation of the peninsula. While it may be an oversimplification of a complicated process to lay the blame of the Commission’s failure solely upon the shoulders of the anti-trusteeship bloc, their continued presence delivered the Soviet Union reason to block their participation, and (by United States’ calculations) exclude over 15 million politically conservative Koreans from participating in this “democratic” process. 2 As will be detailed below the question became a matter of a weighing a political group’s right to free speech over their unqualified acceptance of the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. Joint Commission Areas of Success Despite the Joint Commission’s ultimate failure, the two delegations did experience successes worthy of mention. The meetings themselves commenced on March 20, 1946 with a fog of optimism, as suggested in the following Press Release that described the reception that the American Delegation arranged in conjunction with the Soviet delegates’ arrival in Seoul: Arriving at Duc Soo Palace after a drive through streets lined with throngs of Korean citizens and passing though aisles of colorfully uniformed Korean mounted and foot police and U.S. Army honor guards, the delegates were greeted by music of a U.S. Army band. Before entering the conference room Generals [John R.] Hodge, [T. F.] Shtikov and [Archibald V.] Arnold inspected the U.S. Army guard at the palace. 3 1 The text of the MoscowDecision on Korea: fromYoung HumKim. EastAsia’s Turbulent Century. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. P. 317–18. 2 Transcript of the Fifty-Seventh Meeting of the US-USSR Joint Commission, Seoul, Korea, 3 September 1947 // NARA. 3 Special Press Release. March 21, 1946 // NARA.