Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия Доклады Международного конгресса по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки. Т. 1. 2020 333 A Dispute over Trusteeship Throughout these proceedings the dispute between the two occupiers centered on a single word: trusteeship. From there emerged a tangled web of differences that eventually caused an initial suspension in the talks, and later their complete breakdown. Trusteeship administration, a product of the Wilson-Roosevelt line in American foreign policy, had been tacitly understood as the mode in which post-liberated Korea would be administered as early as December 1943, when U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek met in Cairo, Egypt where they drafted a public communiqué that mapped out Northeast Asia’s postwar fate. Their insertion of the phrase “in due course” informed that prior to the peninsula gaining sovereignty it would endureAllied occupation to guide the people toward this end. The question left unanswered at this meeting concerned which states would participate, with Roosevelt envisioning the “four policemen” — the three participants at this meeting plus the Soviet Union — assuming this task. The president gained Stalin’s cautious approval in Teheran when he and Churchill met with Stalin soon after the Cairo meeting, and then later at Yalta. 1 Alternative scenarios for Korea’s post-liberation did emerge, including the idea that Japan would continue to administer Korean trusteeship 2 , as well as Koreans being granted immediate sovereignty 3 . But future meetings between the Allied forces leaders reaffirmed the Cairo decision; following Japan’s surrender the United States and the Soviet divided Korean occupation duties at the 38 th parallel. In December 1945 foreign ministers from the Soviet Union (Vyacheslav Molotov), United States (James F. Byrnes), and Great Britain (Ernest Bevin) met in Moscow to discuss outstanding World War II issues, including the divided Korea peninsula. The three officials succeeded in carving out a plan to reunite a peninsula that was growing increasingly volatile. 4 The four-part roadmap towards Korean sovereignty, which became known as the Moscow Decision, confirmed that 1) the 1 Stalin responded to Roosevelt’s idea of a decades-long occupation by advising it be as short in duration as possible. See B. Cumings. The Origins of the KoreanWar: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1981. P. 109. 2 For the idea of Japan administering post-war Korea, see H. Borton. Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002. P. 80–81; Letter, Hoover to Stimson (May 15, 1945) // Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Reel 112. New Haven, CT: Yale University Library. 3 S. Welles. The Time for Decision. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. P 300–301; A. Granjdanzev. Korea LooksAhead. NewYork: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944. P. 60–61. 4 One early report on the Korean situation likened the conditions of a divided Korea to a “powder keg ready to explode upon application of a spark.” See The Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State (September 15, 1945). Foreign Relations of the United States [from here FRUS] // 1945 VI, The British Commonwealth, The Far East. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971. P. 1049–53.