XXX Международный конгресс ИИСАА. 19–21 июня 2019 г. Т. 2

Секция XVII 190 XXX Международный Конгресс по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки role. This organisation was staffed by many pro-Marxists who were familiar with Soviet literature. […] A group of bureaucrats based mainly in the planning agency, often called kakushin kanryo, [ 革新官僚 ] the reformist bureaucrats, also studied methods of Soviet planning, as well as those of the Nazis.” Thus Manchukuo implemented five-year plans which were modelled upon Soviet planning whilst “the Ministry of Military Procurement performed the same role as the Soviet Gosplan” 1 . Charles K. Armstrong argues that “Because of colonial industrialization, North Korea was uniquely situated among Asian countries to follow the path of Stalinist industrial development” 2 . Kimura notes that in North Korea, even before 1945, and certainly afterwards, “the blend of the two ideologies, Stalinism and Japanese imperial fascism, produced the main current of economic policy […] the primary goal [of which] was heavy industrialisation and finally military victory enabling them to conduct territorial expansion, which […] was demonstrated by its attack on the South in 1950” 3 . This is whilst South Korea under Park Chung-hee also implemented a series of five-year Plans, the first of which was announced in January 1962. Park had in fact drawn inspiration from his memories of “the Manchurian model of military-backed forced-paced industrialisation” 4 , a point that Bruce Cumings and Nicholas Eberstadt agree on 5 . Meanwhile the legal and administrative machinery of North Korea exhibited clear descent from colonial institutions. Courthouses built by the Japanese remained in use, and “Japanese colonial law remained in effect until a new law code was promulgated in the spring of 1946. The result was to a great extent a modified Japanese legal code combined with a Soviet-style judicial system” 6 . On the other hand, the initial purge of colonial personnel backfired by producing a vacuum of legal and administrative talent; some of the colonial era staff, deemed “progressive”, were later readmitted after being put through retraining sessions, to the extent where the Justice Bureau chief, Ch’oe Yongdal, admitted that “he had inadvertently allowed many ‘pro- 1 Kimura, “From Fascism to Communism”, 81. 2 Armstrong, North Korean Revolution, 136. 3 Kimura, “From Fascism to Communism”, 82. 4 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, 311. 5 “Throughout the expansion of the 1930s and the Pacific war, the implementation of war-mobilizational policies was always more moderate in Japan itself than in its possessions and quasi-colonies — a distinction attributable to many factors, not the least of these being that the Japanese military was freer to promote its vision of ‘development planning’in settings inhabited by non-Japanese populations. Park Chung-hee was thus not only exposed in the classroom and the dormitory to economic development. He also witnessed it in practice in Manchuria: first during the years in the academy and then later as a lieutenant in the Japanese KwangtungArmy. For a variety of readily understandable reasons, neither Park nor his South Korean critics chose to dwell on this aspect of his personal history. In retrospect, however, there can be little doubt that it made a lasting impression.” Eberstadt, Divided Korea, 101–102. 6 Armstrong, North Korean Revolution, 202, 197.