XXX Международный конгресс ИИСАА. 19–21 июня 2019 г. Т. 2

Источниковедение и историография Кореи к 150-летию академика В. В. Бартольда (1869–1930). Ч. 2 183 interpretation that permitted no deviation from its text. Political organizations wishing to participate in the process must demonstrate staunch support for both the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission. Thus membership by Koreans in anti- trusteeship groups blocked their participation in this process. The United States in principle supported this idea, but added that the fundamental human right of freedom of expression allowed for Korean criticism as long as their actions remained legal 1 . The documentary history demonstrates that Korean criticism extended beyond simple verbal opposition to include mass demonstration, harassment of Commission participants, and vows to halt the process altogether. While British representatives did not participate directly in the Commission, their commentary on the proceedings offers a third perspective to the issues that complicated the Soviet and United States efforts 2 . The talks did realize sprouts of success. By late 1947 the Commission accepted responses from 435 democratic parties and social organizations to a questionnaire that sought Korean opinion on social and economic issues. The Soviet andAmerican Delegations separated the groups ideologically into the right, moderate, and left supporters. Korean responses suggest that on certain issues, such as nationalization and land reform, these groupings overlapped. They showed more separation in their political views regarding who they favored to lead the new state and how political appointments should be made. Conservative groups favored election while more liberal groups backed a selection process 3 . Transcripts of discussions at meetings and actions taken by the two participating delegations suggest that issues unrelated to the proceedings may also have contributed to the Commission’s failure. Both sides accused the other of harassing political and religious groups and incarcerating opposition leaders. During the recess in the talks both sides initiatedmeasures that moved northern and southern Korean societies closer to the vision they held of the future Korean state. During a recess in the meetings, the United States initiated efforts to form southern Korea’s legal institutions, including the drafting of a constitution and the preparation for southern-only elections. Suspicions by both sides of their opposition counterpart attempting to adjust accept or refuse party and organization to strengthen their ideological base closed doors to compromise of any kind emerging. The talks reaching an insurmountable impasse the United States turned to the United Nations for resolution, an alternative that the Soviet Union rejected. The significance of the Joint Commission’s failure was felt by a devastating war, and peninsular division that continues to the present. 1 Chistakov to Hodge. (October 26, 1947). NationalArchives and RecordsAdministration (NARA), College Park, MD. RG 43. 2 Korea: Joint Commission Deadlock. (July 22, 1947). Correspondence Respecting Korea: Part 1, January to December 1947 file, National Archives, UK. 3 Analysis of Replies to Questionnaire Submitted to the Joint Commission. (September 30, 1947). NARA RG 43.