XXX Международный конгресс ИИСАА. 19–21 июня 2019 г. Т. 1

Секция II 104 XXX Международный Конгресс по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки Henceforth, the Spanish Crown faced the problem of supplying the African strongholds out of Málaga, which acted as a “great regulatory station” of the traffic en route toAfrica and, as a result, had to face growing harassment by NorthAfrican corsairs, who continuously threatened the passage of goods and people along the Mediterranean routes (Braudel 1987, 153–154). From Oran, Spain maintained its control over the surrounding zone with difficulty and turned neighboring territories into feudatories, such as Tlemcen (Sánchez Doncel 1991, 173; De La Véronee 1983). To maintain a Spanish population and garrison within the stronghold, the Emperor granted a range of immunities and grants to the Christians of Oran and nearby Mazalquivir on May 5, 1525, at the request of its governor, Luis Fernández de Córdoba, second Marquis of Comares (Sánchez Doncel 1991, 173). This measure confirms continuity with the legal and fiscal uses previously adopted by the Spanish Crown so as to maintain the old frontier with the Nasrid emirate (González Jiménez 1989, 211–219). 2. On the other hand, in terms of foreign policy, Spain tried to oppose the growing expansion of the Ottoman Empire via the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Danube Basin, and the Balkan Peninsula, thus trying to thwart its attempt at settlement in the African- Maghreb strip. The Turks, from the year 1480, after an ephemeral attack to the south of Italy, showed a growing interest in occupying maritime bases in Africa that would allow them to spread with guarantees throughout the European West while, between 1516 and 1517, they caused the fall of the Mamluk dynasty of Egypt, thereby inaugurating their expansion from the Mashriq to the Magrib. Meanwhile, one of the corsairs known as Barbarossa (Bābā ‘Arūdj), who had taken Algiers in 1516, joined with his brothers, Ḵẖayr al-Dīn and Isḥāḳ, and conducted an intense campaign of privateering in the service of the Ottomans, which was thus able to extend Turkish control over North Africa between 1518 and 1520 (Heers 2002, 45–55; Le Tourneau 1986, 677–679). In the first half of the sixteenth century Tlemcen was a sultanate in decay, threatened by internal disputes among the members of the ruling family and the aspirations of emerging powers within the environs, especially Spain, from its base in Oran, and Turkey, through the domain of Algiers (Marçais 1986, 93; Braudel, 1928, 214–215). The Tlemcenian population was dissatisfied with its sovereignAbū ‘AbdAllāh Muḥammad V al-Ṯẖābitī b. Muḥammad IV (910–22 H./1504–16), of the Banū ‘Abd al-Wād dynasty (Zayyānids) (Ilahiane 2006, 3–4, 157–158; Marçais 1986, 93; Bargès 1887, 415–425), for having submitted to vassalage under the Spanish and transformed the sultanate into a tribute-paying dependency of Spain. Moreover, Spain set down in the agreements with Tlemcen of May-June, 1511, that all its commerce was to be channelled through Oran, a city that in the years that followed was to become the centre of all Spain’s trade with Africa (López Beltrán, 1985). On the death of the Sultan at the end of 1516, there was a dynastic crisis between two pretenders to the throne: the brother of the deceased, Abū Zayyān, and his uncle